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THE TRIBUNE

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If you will soon reach the age of 65, or 68, or 70, and do not draw pension, write for a blank, to The National Tribune, Washington, D. C.

ONE DOLLAR A YEAR.

WASHINGTON, D. C., THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1905.

VOL. XXIV—NO. 9—WHOLE NO. 1267.

War of the Rebellion

OPENING OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

By JOHN MCELROY.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

Another of Chas. A. Dana's Character-Sketching Letters—The Johnson's Family Operations on the Outside—Presence of the Siege Upon the Defenders—Grandly Spectacular Assault Upon Fort Hill—Another Failure Brings the Lines Still Closer.

Charles A. Dana had commended himself to Secretary Stanton by his investigations of the cotton business in the Mississippi Valley, which led to the issuance by the President of a proclamation prohibiting all trade with the country in rebellion except under regulations to be prescribed by the Treasury Department; to the issuing of regulations by the Treasury Department governing such trade, and putting the cotton business under the special care

of the Treasury Department to be managed by special agents, and to the War Department making a general order prohibiting all officers from engaging in any way in the purchase or sale of cotton. This order was warmly welcomed by Gens. Grant, Sherman and others, as it relieved them of a great deal of responsibility and annoyance on account of the precious staple, of which there were immense quantities inside the lines of the army and constantly being brought inside by the enemy, and very demoralizing trade which sorely tempted Brigadier-Generals, Colonels and minor officers, to the great detriment of the public service and of military discipline. Gen. Grant and his immediate surrounding had but one idea, that of military success, and wanted every energy bent toward that end. They resented any thought of pecuniary profit out of the terrible war which was costing such a fearful price in men's lives. Cotton, which had been bringing 10 cents a pound in 1860, leaped up to 88 cents a pound in 1862 and reached \$2 the next year. There were almost limitless quantities of it in the rich bottom lands of the Mis-

issippi. If they were all suppressed, especially the Colonels. "Grant has three Aids with the rank of Captain. Capt. Ross is a relative of Mrs. Grant. He has been a stage driver, and violates English grammar at every phrase. He is of some use, for he attends to the mails. Capt. Audenried is an elegant young officer of the Regular cavalry. He rides after the General when he rides out. The rest of the time he does nothing at all. Capt. Badeau, wounded at Port Hudson, since he was attached to Grant's staff, has not yet reported. I must not omit the General Medical Staff of this army. It is in bad order. Its head, Dr. Mills, is impracticable, earnest, quarrelsome. He was relieved several weeks since, but Grant likes him and kept him on till the fall of Vicksburg. In this he was right, no doubt, for a change during the siege would have been troublesome. The change, I presume, will now be made. It must be for the better.

"The office of Chief of Artillery on the General Staff I had forgotten, as well as that of Chief Engineer. The former is occupied by the Major, Duff, of the 2d Ill. Art. He is unequal to the position, not only because he is disqualified by sickness, but because he does not sufficiently understand the management of artillery. The siege suffered greatly from his incompetence. Gen. Grant knows, of course, that he is not the right person, but it is one of his weaknesses that he is unwilling to hurt the

value, though under another General he might not be worth so much. The Chief Engineer, Capt. Stearns, wounded about July 15, is a man of merit, and his departure was a great loss to the siege works. Gen. Sherman has three Aids—Capt. McCoy, Capt. Dayton and Lieut. Hill, and, as I have said, neither of them holds a sinecure office. His Medical Director, Dr. McMillan, is a good physician, I believe; he has been a member of the medical corps with Dr. Mills. The Quartermaster, Lieut.-Col. J. C. Smith, is a most efficient officer; he has been doing duty as Commissary also. On the whole, Gen. Sherman has a very small and very efficient staff, but the efficiency comes mainly from him. What a splendid soldier he is!

"McPherson's Staff. "The staff of the Seventeenth Army Corps is the most complete, the most numerous and in some respects the most serviceable in this army. The Adjutant-General, Lieut.-Col. Clark, is a person of uncommon quickness; always at the desk, and in the best of his department in first-rate order. The Inspector-General, Lieut.-Col. Strong, does his duties with promptness and thoroughness; his reports are models. The Chief of Artillery, Lieut.-Col. Powell, thoroughly understands his business and attends to it diligently. The Provost Marshal-General, Lieut.-Col. Willard, is a judicious and experienced officer. "Both the Quartermaster and Commissary are new men, Captains, and I do not know them, but McPherson speaks highly of them. The Medical Director, Dr. Boucher, has the reputation of keeping his hospitals in better order and making his reports more promptly and satisfactorily than any other Medical officer in the army. McPherson has four Aids—Capt. Steele, Capt. Gould, Lieut. Knox and Lieut. Vernay. The last of these is the best. Capt. Steele is next to him. The engineer, Capt. Gould, is a clever, enterprising man, quick, watchful, but not of great capacity. The picket officer, Maj. Willard, whom I accidentally met last, is a person of unusual merit.

"In the staffs of the Division and Brigadier-Generals I do not now recall any officer of extraordinary capacity. There may be several, but I have not made their acquaintance. On the other hand, I have made the acquaintance of some who seemed quite unfit for their places. I must not, however, to speak here of Capt. Theodorian, Engineer on the staff of Maj.-Gen. Logan. His general services during the siege were not conspicuous, but he deserves great credit for constructing the wooden barriers which Gen. McPherson used near his close with most remarkable effect. Both the idea and the work were Trevelian's.

"Very possibly you may not wish to go through this mass of details respecting so many officers of inferior grades, upon whose claims you may never be called to pass judgment. But if you care to read them here they are.

"I remain, dear sir, yours very faithfully, C. A. Dana."

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's Operations. It soon became evident to the authorities at Richmond that Kirby Smith did not or would not do anything of material importance from the west side of the river to relieve Pemberton. He would not, or at least did not, even do anything of consequence to interfere with Grant's line of communications along the river back to Cairo. Kirby Smith's men had a mortal terror of the gunboats, and it was always with difficulty that they were brought to battle anywhere within the range of the heavy guns of the flotilla. Therefore, all hopes centered upon the operations of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, and the army which he was organizing at Jackson. Gen. Johnston's great abilities he was not a man of the energy, initiative and resourcefulness of such Generals as Grant, Sherman and Thomas. He was dangerous on the defensive and quick and deadly in the matter of return blows, as Sherman found out on the Atlanta campaign, but either the field to which he had been assigned was too big for him, or it was too big for his tactical superiors. The latter constantly and emphatically urged him to strike a blow, and Johnston as constantly answered that he was too weak to do anything effective, and, beside, that he had to supply his men for the field before he could make any movement.

McPherson's Staff. "The staff of the Thirteenth Corps was formed by Gen. McPherson. The Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieut.-Col. Scates, is a man of about 55 or 60 years old. He was a Judge in Illinois, and left an honored and influential social position to serve in the army. Gen. Ord speaks in high terms of him as an officer. The Chief of Artillery, Col. Maucher, is an ass. The Chief Quartermaster, Lieut.-Col. Dunlap, Gen. McPherson's father-in-law, lately resigned his commission. He was incompetent. Our commission here at Cairo last summer reported that he proved it. His successor has not yet been appointed. The Chief Commissary, Lieut.-Col. Taggart, is a fussy fellow, who, with much show, accomplishes but little. Gen. McPherson's Aids went away with him or are absent on leave. Not a man of them is worth having. The Engineer officer on this staff, Lieut. Hains, is an industrious and useful officer. The Medical Director, Dr. Hammond, has just been appointed.

Sherman's Staff. "In the Fifteenth Corps's staff all have to be working men, for Sherman is a man who does not find something for everybody to do. If an officer proves unfit for his position, he shifts him to some other place. Thus, his Adjutant, Lieut.-Col. Hammond, a restless Kentuckian, kept everything in a row as long as he remained in that office. Sherman has accordingly made him

feelings of a friend; and so he keeps him on. The Chief Engineer, Capt. Cornstock, is an officer of great Col. Duff, has, too, what his predecessor, Capt. Prime, lacked, a talent for organization. His accession to the army will be the result of a proper organization and strength which Gen. McPherson used near his close with most remarkable effect. Both the idea and the work were Trevelian's.

Grant's Staff. "I now come to the staff organization and staff officers of this army, beginning, of course, with those connected with the head of the Department. Grant's staff is a curious mixture of good, bad and indifferent. As he is neither an organizer nor a disciplinarian himself, his staff is naturally a mosaic of accidental elements and family friends. It contains four working men, two who are able to accomplish their duties without much work, and several who either don't think of work or who accomplish nothing, no matter what they undertake.

Lieut.-Col. Rawlins, Grant's Assistant Adjutant-General, is a very industrious, conscientious man, who never loses a moment, and never gives himself any indulgence except sleeping and scolding. He is a lawyer by profession, a townsman of Grant's, and has a great influence over him, especially because he watches him day and night, and whenever he commits the folly of tasting liquor, hastens to remind him that at the beginning of the war he gave him (Rawlins) his word of honor not to touch a drop as long as he lasted. Grant thinks Rawlins a first-rate Adjutant, but I think this is a mistake. He is too slow, and can't write the English language correctly without a great deal of careful consideration. Indeed, illiterateness is a general characteristic of Grant's staff, and, in fact, of Grant's Generals and regimental officers of all ranks.

"Maj. Bowers, Judge-Advocate of Grant's staff, is an excellent man, and always finds work to do. Lieut.-Col. Wilson, Inspector-General, is a person of similar disposition. He is a Captain of Engineers in the Regular Army, and has rendered valuable services in that capacity. The fortifications of Haynes's Bluff were designed by him and executed under his direction. His leading idea is the idea of duty, and he applies it vigorously and often impatiently to others. In consequence he is unpopular among all who like to live with little work. But he has remarkable talents and uncommon executive power, and will be heard from hereafter.

"The Quartermaster's Department is under charge of Lieut.-Col. Bingham, who is one of those I spoke of as accomplishing much with little work. He is an invalid almost, and has never been seen when he appeared to be perfectly well; but he is a man of first-rate abilities and solid character, and, barring physical weakness, up to even greater responsibilities than those he now bears.

"The Chief Commissary, Lieut.-Col. Macfadyen, is a jolly, agreeable fellow, who never seems to be at work, but I have heard no complaint of deficiencies in his Department. On the contrary, it seems to be one of the most efficient parts of this great war machine.

"Lieut.-Col. Kent, Provost Marshal-General, is a very industrious and sensible man, a great improvement on his predecessor, Col. Hillyer, who was a family and personal friend of Grant's.

The Aids. "There are two Aids-de-Camp with the rank of Colonel, namely, Col. Lagow and Col. Riggins, both personal friends of Grant's. Lagow is a worthless, whiskey-drinking, useless fellow. Riggins is decent and gentlemanly, but neither of them is worth his salt, so far as service to the Government goes. In fact, in all my observation I have never discovered the use of Grant's Aids-de-Camp at all. On the battlefield he sometimes sends orders by them, but I suppose they are idle loafers, if I suppose the army would be better off

	Present for duty.	Aggregate present.	Present and absent.
Loring's Division.	6,451	7,427	13,375
Breckinridge's Division.	6,107	6,884	9,688
Walker's Division.	9,511	9,511	19,022
French's Division.	5,498	7,456	10,559
Jackson's Cavalry.	3,606	4,373	6,797
Miscellaneous.	615	594	881
Total.	31,226	36,315	54,747

Steadily Urged to Attack. Every few days during May and June the Confederate Secretary of War sent messages urging Johnston to attack without regard to any disparity of numbers, inasmuch as Grant was being reinforced more rapidly than Johnston could be, and the disparity would therefore become greater instead of less. May 28 Johnston said that though he had only 23,000 men he would try to beat Grant with his number, but he thought better of it and June 7 he telegraphed Richmond that the case seemed "desperate." The next day the Secretary of War sent him more reinforcements should be drawn from Bragg's army, and Johnston diplomatically replied that this would involve yielding Tennessee; the Government must decide between this State and Tennessee.

This brought up the old bitterness between Johnston and Davis. They were once again at odds. Johnston, on the other hand, as a "brother patriot," could not but have been unwilling to throw upon the other the responsibility for disaster, if, as was possible, Bragg's army had been suddenly shifted to Mississippi to help Pemberton out, the whole of Tennessee, northern Alabama and northern Georgia, with the key-point of Chattanooga, would be open to the Union army under Rosecrans. This was a very serious possibility, because in the event of the defeat of that army by the troops being sent to Grant the loss of the Tennessee country would be final and hopeless, and the prestige of the Confederacy would be very depreciated. Jefferson Davis did not wish to assume the responsibility of such a step, and desired to place it upon Johnston, who could put it on the ground of a "military necessity." Johnston, however, kept thrusting it back at Davis to force him to make a decision

(Continued on page 5.)

MINNESOTA AT NASHVILLE.

More of Her Soldiers There Than in Any Other Battle, and More Fell There in Defense of Their Country.

By Gen. L. F. HUBBARD.

(Continued from last week.)

Daylight of the 16th disclosed the unmistakable purpose of Hood to stake everything upon a final effort to retrieve his discomfiture of the preceding day. He had chosen a position of great natural advantage, and had entrenched it in a manner that impressed us at once that we were "up against" a serious proposition.

Thomas's lines required considerable readjustment to conform to the positions he had now to confront. In these preliminary movements Hood's artillery much delayed and complicated the required dispositions in their process of formation. Every available man was ordered to the front. Nashville was now reasonably safe, and the troops left for its immediate defense were required to strengthen the attacking lines.

I digress here for a moment to indicate the exact position of the Minnesota regiments in this final formation. All the brigades of the Sixteenth Corps were formed in double lines. The position of the 10th Minn. was upon the left in the front line of the First Brigade; the 5th and 9th Minn. constituted the front line of the Second Brigade, and the 7th Minn. was upon the right of the Third Brigade, also in front, thus bringing the

termination on the charge. The ground had been much softened by the recent storm, a condition that considerably retarded progress, but otherwise did not check the movement. The advance was maintained with notable steadiness, though distressing gaps in the ranks told too well the effectiveness of the enemy's fire. The colors of all the regiments repeatedly fell, but were always rescued and borne onward. The 3d Minn. had three of its color-bearers killed and four of its color guard wounded. Nearly every mounted officer lost his horse which settled his nerve. The ground was thickly strewn with dead and wounded men, but even the latter joined in the cheers that now rent the air in great volume as the rebel works were reached and in a wild onset carried at every point. Most of the enemy surrendered in the trenches where they stood, his artillery being abandoned on the spot from whence those vicious discharges of canister had brought us so much grief. Hood's defensive line had been pierced at a vital point, and if another hour of daylight had granted to charge them, but to rout them, vouchsafed us, his line of retreat would have been in Gen. Thomas's hands.

Hood's Line Broken.

This break in Hood's defenses and the consequent threatening of his rear necessarily loosened his grip at other points, and the general attack which followed was uniformly successful. The advantage was pressed to the utmost until darkness put a period to further fight, but Hood's army was essentially a wreck. Abandoning his artill-

the civil war. The army of the enemy encountered at Nashville was not simply defeated, but it was practically destroyed. It left the field in demoralized fragments, and even these dissolved like snow under an April sun. It also decided to withdraw to the enemy's campaign undertaken under promising conditions for a purpose which, if successful, would have had a most serious effect upon the Union cause. Hood had reached the Ohio River it would have been a fair offset to Sherman's march to the sea. It would doubtless have necessitated another levy of troops at a time when the resources of the country, both in men and in the sinews of war, were strained almost to the limit. (It had already been proposed by Gen. Grant in one of the dispatches to Washington that has been quoted that the States of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois be called on for 60,000 men to meet this threatened danger.) It would have precipitated conditions that might have seriously embarrassed the situation on the Potomac and throughout the theater of war in the East.

Thomas's defeat paralyzed the enemy in the West, and enabled him to send a corps under Schofield to reinforce Grant in the East and another column under Smedley Butler to aid in the capture of the last stronghold of the enemy in the West at Mobile, Ala. A part of the army with which Thomas won Nashville was in at the death of the Confederacy in Virginia and another part witnessed its dying struggles on the Gulf of Mexico. It required the genius of a great Captain to organize and equip men from fragments and resources of his hand such an army as Thomas hurled against Hood and infused into it in so short a time the morale that would enable it to win the decisive results that were secured at Nashville.

The War for the Union developed many great military characters, but the peer of any of them in sterling soldierly qualities, skill in tactical warfare and indomitable courage and determination in battle was Maj.-Gen. George H. Thomas.

Final Charge of the Day. A spirited description of the operations of the Minnesota regiments in the battle above Nashville was written by a pioneer Minnesotan, a staff officer of the First Division at the time, and published in the St. Paul Press of Dec. 30, 1864. I here quote a passage from that description.

"At 3 o'clock p. m. the clouds had thickened and a moderate rain commenced to fall; the atmosphere became prematurely darkened and a night was setting in. The cavalry force which had been operating vigorously on the extreme right, and well toward the rear of the enemy, apparently became blinded by the mist which settled upon the hills, and their firing materially slackened. 'Old Man Smith'—as the boys of his command delighted to call him—and Gen. McArthur were about, and the First Division—Joe Moore's old division—must maintain its dearly-bought laurels of former days. The division was to charge Cheatham's veterans—not only to charge them, but to rout them, capture and destroy them, and, if possible, write their history in lines of blood as doomed rebels who once existed, but who this charge would no longer exist. It was not known in military and confidential circles in Nashville that this telling charge was to be made, or at what time it was to be made, but somehow or other they felt it in their bones that it would come off at about the time it did, and many were there to witness it. We find also Gen. Thomas at hand—accidentally, perhaps—but he was there, to witness the exciting scene. Gen. Smith was there, of course, muscle and nerve all in motion, knowing then, as well what would be the result as he did when it was made. The very embodiment of the towering, all-conquering veteran that he is, eyeing with more than wonted confidence the compact lines of his veterans, and with a gleam that powerfully-knit frame and that intelligent and well-developed Scotch face, firmness amounting almost to stubbornness visible in every feature, sat on his horse awaiting the proper moment to give the final order. And, as if to make the picture complete, Andrew Johnson, whom the soldiers of the Union and the people at large have just honored with the second office in the gift of the Nation, was close at hand to behold the grand military drama about to be enacted.

"The hour arrives—4 o'clock precisely, by McArthur's time. The order goes forth, and with a shout that is heard plainly away off in our old lines near Nashville, the division starts for the works before it. The very air is filled with leads off. Col. Hubbard, with hat in hand, waving it over his head, leads on his trusty warriors. He knows what is coming, and he knows what the result will be. Across the cornfield, the soft ground giving away until men and horses sink at every step knee-deep; shoulder to shoulder, canister, shot and minie-balls filling every inch of the atmosphere and meeting them square in the face, they keep onward. The works are gained, no faltering yet; and now goes up the flag of the 9th Minn. and the works; simultaneously with it the flag of the veteran 5th—which has been shot down four times in this advance and ridden with a full charge of canister—ascends; the works are carried in front of all the brigades of the division, and Minnesota holds the position in an unbroken line of half a mile in extent. Prisoners of the enemy are taken. First comes Capt. McGrew, of the 5th, a staff officer of Col. Hubbard's, with about a regiment of them; then we meet officers of the 9th Minn. and the regiments with squads larger than they can be supposed to take care of—in all, the captures amounting to at least 1,000 men. There were in the Second Brigade. The whole work—a work that all military men who witnessed it agree in pronouncing a charge of scarcely equaled brilliancy in the annals of warfare—was accomplished in 10 minutes' time. The enemy was completely routed and driven to the adjacent hills in utter confusion. Ten pieces of artillery of the first quality were captured, in addition to small arms and prisoners without number.

"Minnesota gained more glory than she had previously allowed her to gain. The gallantry of her officers and men is the theme of all tongues and pens. Col. Hubbard was personally complimented immediately after the action by Gens. Thomas, Smith and McArthur uniting in a telegram to the President requesting his promotion.


Highly Honorable Mention.

The Minnesota troops received highly honorable mention in the official reports of the battle of Nashville, in which occur the following:

Gen. John McArthur, commanding First Division, Sixth Corps, says: "I wish, particularly, to mention the gallant conduct of Col. Wm. R. Marshall, 7th Minn., commanding Third Brigade, called to take command during the first day's battle and continuing throughout. His admirable management and example stamp him as an officer of rare merit."

Gen. A. J. Smith, commanding the Sixteenth Corps, says: "Col. L. F. Hubbard had three horses shot under him on the 16th. Going into action with a total of 1,421 muskets in

(Continued on page two.)



THE FIGHT AT THE CRATER AFTER THE EXPLOSION OF A UNION MINE UNDER THE CONFEDERATE FORT.

of the Treasury Department to be managed by special agents, and to the War Department making a general order prohibiting all officers from engaging in any way in the purchase or sale of cotton. This order was warmly welcomed by Gens. Grant, Sherman and others, as it relieved them of a great deal of responsibility and annoyance on account of the precious staple, of which there were immense quantities inside the lines of the army and constantly being brought inside by the enemy, and very demoralizing trade which sorely tempted Brigadier-Generals, Colonels and minor officers, to the great detriment of the public service and of military discipline. Gen. Grant and his immediate surrounding had but one idea, that of military success, and wanted every energy bent toward that end. They resented any thought of pecuniary profit out of the terrible war which was costing such a fearful price in men's lives. Cotton, which had been bringing 10 cents a pound in 1860, leaped up to 88 cents a pound in 1862 and reached \$2 the next year. There were almost limitless quantities of it in the rich bottom lands of the Mis-




A look out at joining.

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Finding in Mr. Dana a man of inflexible honesty, of keen intelligence and undoubted patriotism, Mr. Stanton decided to send him to the Army of the Tennessee to see for him the facts in the vexed conditions there, and determine whether the partisans of McClelland or those of Grant were telling the truth. Stanton confided very fully to Dana what he wanted him to see and report on, but covered his errand with an official order making him Inspector of Postmasters, which would give him access to all parts of the army and an apparent business at every headquarters. Dana immediately conceived a warm admiration for Grant, Sherman and McPherson, especially Sherman, whom he esteemed one of the most brilliant and able men he had ever met. He sent his letters to the Secretary daily, if possible, and in a cipher, so confidential. Much as he thought of Grant, Sherman and McPherson his expression of views was thoroughly impartial, and he did not hesitate to tell anyone. Gen. Grant took to him from the first, and his constant communication with the War Department relieved Grant of the necessity for more frequent reports, to which he was adverse. Grant never liked to report except when he had accomplished something.

One of Mr. Dana's letters, and one of extreme importance in forming the judgment of President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton as to the characters and capacities of the officers in the Army of the Tennessee, does not appear in the official records, and is as follows:

Gen. C. C. Washburn.

"Dear Sir: In my letter of yesterday I accidentally omitted to notice Gen. C. C. Washburn among the Generals of Division in Grant's army. It is



PLAN OF THE VICKSBURG MINE, FROM DRAWING BY BRIG.-GEN. HICKENLOOPER.

Inspector-General, and during the last two months has kept him constantly employed on scouting parties. In his place as Adjutant is Capt. Sawyer, a quiet, industrious, efficient person. The Chief of Artillery, Maj. Taylor, directed by Sherman's omnipresent eye and quick judgment, is an officer of great



"THE PURSUIT OF HOOD'S ARMY WAS PARTICULARLY SEVERE."

four Minnesota regiments in a continuous line and all in front.

The Second Day's Battle.

It was past mid-day before Thomas's lines were finally adjusted, but in the meantime the Sixteenth Corps had worked itself forward to within moderate range of the enemy's defenses, where slight intrenchments were constructed, sufficient to enable a few sharpshooters to get in their work. The artillery of the division had expended much ammunition in responding to the enemy's batteries, and in places had succeeded in breaching the hostile intrenchments. About 3 o'clock p. m. an assault was made far to the left on Overton Hill, whose crest was crossed by Hood's defensive line, by three brigades of Gens. Wood's and Steedman's troops, but though gallantly made the assault was repulsed with serious loss to the troops engaged. That, evidently, was not a vulnerable point in Hood's defense, and then Gen. Thomas practically repeated his initial order of the preceding day for Gen. Smith to make a "vigorous attack on the enemy's left."

This order went forth at 4 o'clock p. m., and the men who for hours had lain with enforced inactivity under the enemy's fire, greeted it with a feeling of relief. There can hardly be a more depressing condition in practical warfare than to lie for hours exposed to a galling fire that cannot be effectively returned, while held in leash in momentary expectation of an opportunity to make reprisals on one's tormentors.

Our Minnesota boys were here under a peculiar but most stimulating inspiration. In no instance before during the war were nearly so many of Minnesota's sons in line together facing the country's foe. Surely this was an opportunity to show the material of which Minnesota soldiers was made, and to achieve glory for the young Commonwealth in which they took so great a pride. Some of these regiments had been in many battles and never suffered a defeat. The older of the regiments had an established reputation to maintain, and the younger ones had here an opportunity to win for their colors and their State the fullest possible measure of glory. No order in battle was ever more promptly responded to, and no troops were ever more eager in its execution. The line of advance lay across level ground—a recently-cultivated cornfield—except the front of the 10th Minn., where the topography presented a considerable elevation. The moment the division rose to its feet and commenced its advance it was met with a withering volley from the enemy's trenches and heavy discharges of canister from three batteries of artillery. It seemed for a moment that nothing human could withstand such a murderous fire at so close a range, but the men were nerved up to the limit of possible tension, and they started with grim de-

lery, wagon trains and all impedimenta that would in any manner impumber movements in retreat, such of his army as was not captured fled in a mob toward, hotly pursued by Thomas. Through capture and destruction it underwent a rapid process of disintegration all the way to the Tennessee River. A few skeleton detachments crossed the river, but as an organization there was practically nothing left of that great army of invasion whose original objective was the country north of the Ohio River.

The Hardships of the Pursuit.

The experience of the Minnesota regiments, as well as the army generally, in the pursuit of the fragments of Hood's army was particularly severe. The weather was cold and wet, raining and snowing by turns; the roads embayed with mud almost untraversable at times, and again frozen into rocky ruts that even the animals refused to tackle in their efforts to drag along the artillery and trains. The troops were without camp equipage of any sort, and had to be supplied with rations. Many who survived the battle succumbed to the rigors of the campaign that followed it.

The most impressive evidence of the serious character of the duty imposed upon the Minnesota regiments in the battle of Nashville and of its comprehensive nature is the list of casualties they suffered: 83 killed or mortally wounded, 237 wounded, and one missing; a total of 301 men was the measure of sacrifice here laid upon the altar of the country's cause. As to the total the 5th Regiment contributed 107, the 7th 62, the 9th 58, and the 10th 74. Most regiments at that period of the war were reduced to a maximum on duty of from 350 to 400 men, which will indicate the large percentage of loss sustained.

A Most Decisive Battle.

The battle of Nashville is always given a place among the decisive battles of